This note uses an analysis of Broussais's objection to medical ontology to suggest why Broussais's neologism o o is derived not from o but from a conflation of o and the plural of o o. For Broussais medical ontology, in contrast to philosophical ontology, always refers to abstract entities alleged to explain sensible symptoms, o o, in the sense of indivisible particles in the writings of Lucretius and Epicurus, are such particles; o are not. Keywords: Broussais, disease, medical ontology CiteULike (...) Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The following demarcates the sense of the human person in Orthodox-Catholic bioethics from the family of senses proper to secular bioethics and philosophy. The radically different sources of knowledge about the senses proper to each discipline suggest that the importation of philosophical and secular psychological distinctions and analyses into true Christianity's concern with the human person, is fundamentally misguided. This suggestion is confirmed by examination of the articles of Crosby, Glannon, Hoswepian, and Meador and Shuman.

The doctrine of double effect shows that for which the moral agent is responsible, by explicating the relationship between the act directly intended and the consequences of that act. I contend that this doctrine is necessary not only for natural law absolutism, but also for Donagan's Kantianism and for Quinn's revised construal of the doctrine, and even for consequentialism, as bioethical implications of the doctrine make clear. For those who do not accept this necessity, I contend that it is necessary (...) metatheoretically, in order to deal with those moral agents with irreconcilably different notions of the morally good. Keywords: cost-benefit analysis, double effect, intention, side effect CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)